FORT CRAIG, N. MEX., August 7, 1861.

    SIR: On the 26th of July I had the honor to report the fact of an unsuccessful attempt to dislodge the Texan troops from the town of Mesilla, since which events of the greatest consequence to my command have occurred. They are now prisoners of war.

    On that day I had reliable information that the enemy would in the course of the night receive a battery of artillery, and if I moved to intercept it with a sufficient force for the purpose they were ready to attack the fort in my absence, and, as I have previously reported, the fort is indefensible against artillery, being perfectly commanded by sand hills for at least half the circle, and the only supply of water at the distance of one and a half miles. Other officers, with myself, became convinced that we must eventually be compelled to surrender if we remained in the fort, and that our only hope of saving the command from capture was in reaching some other military post. I therefore ordered the fort to be evacuated, and such public property as could not be transported with the limited means at the post to be destroyed as far as time would allow, and at 1 o’clock a. m. on the 27th of July I took up the line of march for Fort Stanton, which was believed to be the most practicable point to reach, and was reported to be threatened by the enemy. I had no personal knowledge of the road, but it was reported to me that the first day’s march would be 20 miles to Saint Augustine Springs, where there would be abundance of water for all the command.

    Until daylight the command advanced without difficulty, but when the sun arose the day became intensely hot, and soon after the men and teams began to show signs of fatigue, and I found that the distance was greater than had been represented. About 6 miles before reaching the Springs commences a short ascent to a pass in the Organ Mountains and here the men and teams suffered severely with the intense heat and want of water, many men falling and unable to proceed.

    Up to this time there was no indication of pursuit. I now determined to push forward with the mounted force to the Springs, and return with water for the suffering men in the rear. When I had nearly reached the Springs word was brought me that a mounted force was approaching in our rear; but it was believed to be Captain Gibbs, R. M. R., with his command, and soon after that supposition was confirmed by another express.

    On reaching the Springs I found the supply of water so small as to be insufficient for my command. After procuring all the water that could be transported by the men with me I started back to the main body. After riding some distance I became so much exhausted that I could not sit upon my horse, and the command proceeded without me, under the command of Lieutenant Cressey, R. M. R., and I returned to the Springs. Soon after it was reported to me that a part of the teams had given out and could not be brought up, and that large numbers of the infantry had become totally overpowered with the intense heat. At this time an express from Captain Gibbs reported that eight companies of mounted men, supported by artillery and a large force of infantry, were approaching our rear guard. I had the "Call to arms" sounded, and found that I could not bring more than 100 men of the infantry battalion on parade. Captain Gibbs, with a mounted force, now rode into camp, and stated to me that eight companies of mounted Texans (supported by a regiment of infantry, more or less) were approaching; that they had driven in or captured our rear guard (composed of three companies of infantry) and the men that had given out in the rear. Three of the four mountain howitzers that we had with us were with the wagons in the rear and were captured. They were guarded by one company of infantry acting as artillery. Captain Gibbs also reported
that his company, men and horses, had been without water for twenty-four hours.

    Under the circumstances I considered our case hopeless; that it was worse than useless to resist; that honor did not demand the sacrifice of blood and when that sacrifice would be totally useless. A body of mounted Texans followed Captain Gibbs to the vicinity of the camp, when a parley was held, and I surrendered my command to Lieutenant-Colonel Baylor, of the C. S. Army.

    The strength of my command at the time of surrender was, Mounted Rifles, 95 rank and file and 2 officers. The infantry I have not the means of stating the exact number, but there were seven companies of the Seventh Infantry, with 8 officers, present. Since I have been at Fort Fillmore my position has been of extreme embarrassment. Surrounded by open or secret enemies, no reliable information could be obtained, and disaffection prevailing even in my own command, to what extent it was impossible to ascertain, but much increased, undoubtedly, by the conduct of officers who left their post without authority. My position has been one of great difficulty, and has ended in the misfortune of surrendering my command to the enemny. The Texan troops acted with great kindness to our men, exerting themselves in carrying water to the famishing ones in the rear; yet it was two days before the infantry could move from the camup, and then only by the assistance of their captors. The officers and men who chose to give their parole were released at Las Cruces, N. Mex.

    Inclosed is a copy of the terms of surrender.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
I. LYNDE,
Major, Seventh Infantry.

To The ACTING ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Department of New Mexico, Santa Fe.